The	Rationality	of	Perception:	Replies	to	Lord,	Railton,	and	Pautz Susanna	Siegel Book	symposium	forthcoming	in	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research Introduction The	main	task	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	is	to	construct	an	epistemology	of	perception according	to	which	perceptual	experiences	can	be	rational	or	irrational.	On	this	picture, experiences	are	susceptible	to	rational	evaluation.	The	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is that	both	perceptual	experiences	and	the	processes	that	give	rise	to	them	can	be	rational	or irrational. The	epistemic	roles	that	I	attribute	to	perceptual	experiences	are	best	brought	out	by	a subclass	of	cases	in	which	perceptual	experiences	are	heavily	shaped	by	prior	outlooks. These	cases	are	designed	to	bring	specific	kinds	of	epistemic	flaws	in	inference	into	focus by	providing	concrete	examples	in	which	we	can	see	the	flaws	operate.	For	instance, consider	a	preformationist	who	holds	this	theory	on	poor	grounds	and	claims	to	see embryos	in	spermcells	viewed	under	a	microscope.	If	his	visual	experience	presented	him with	spermcells,	and	did	so	because	he	favored	preformationism,	I	argue,	his	visual experience	would	inherit	the	poor	epistemic	status	of	his	belief	in	preformationism.	Both that	belief	and	the	perceptual	experience	would	be	redound	poorly	on	his	rational standing. Cases	like	these	belong	to	a	two-pronged	strategy	in	defending	the	idea	that	experiences are	epistemically	appraisable.	The	first	step	is	to	argue	that	experiences	are	made epistemically	less	powerful	by	certain	influences.	This	step	occurs	in	my	discussion	of epistemic	downgrade	in	Chapter	3.	The	Downgrade	Thesis	summarizes	the	idea	that psychological	precursors	to	perception,	such	as	belief	or	fears,	can	drain	all	or	part	of	the epistemic	power	from	experience.	For	instance,	the	Downgrade	Thesis	predicts	that	the preformationist's	experience	contributes	less	to	his	reason	to	believe	his	eyes	than	it	could, if	it	weren't	hijacked	by	his	ill-founded	belief. The	second	step	argues	that	inference	can	explain	the	epistemic	downgrade	(chapters	5-7). The	conclusions	of	inferences	are	rationally	evaluable,	and	so	if	perceptual	experiences	are such	conclusions,	they	will	be	rationally	evaluable. The	Downgrade	Thesis	and	the	main	claim	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	are	distinct	but related.	If	experiences	can	be	epistemically	rational	or	irrational	(and	more	or	less	so),	then this	fact	can	explain	why	an	experience's	psychological	precursors	can	reduce	or	enhance its	justificatory	power.	The	Rationality	of	Perception	idea	can	explain	the	Downgrade Thesis. 2 The	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	raises	so	many	questions	about	the	epistemic	roles	of perceptual	experience	that	what's	needed,	in	my	estimation,	is	a	constructive	defense	of	it: an	account	of	how	inference	could	affect	the	epistemic	powers	of	perceptual	experience. My	constructive	defense	aims	to	show	that	it	is	coherent	and	plausible	that	perceptual experience	plays	epistemic	roles	that	make	it	rationally	susceptible. As	part	of	my	constructive	defense	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis,	I	defend	an approach	to	inference	according	to	which	inferring	is	a	distinctive	way	of	leveraging information	one	has	already	into	a	new	informational	state.	When	it	is	formed	via	such	a response,	the	new	informational	state	is	the	conclusion	of	the	act	of	inferring.	I	argue	that nothing	precludes	perceptual	experiences	from	being	such	conclusions.	So	part	of	my defense	is	a	general	theory	of	inferring	in	general.	My	target	is	the	kind	of	inferring	the redounds	well	or	poorly	on	the	subject's	rational	standing.	Many	of	the	low-level	processes called	"inference"	in	psychology	would	not	qualify. A	standard	and	intuitive	theory	of	inference	holds	that	when	one	infers	p	from	q,	the inferring	happens	(in	part)	because	the	subject	reckons	that	q	to	support	p.	The "reckoning"-state	is	an	informational	state	of	its	own,	distinct	from	the	premise-state	with content	q	and	the	conclusion-state	with	content	p.	By	occupying	the	reckoning	-state,	one represents	q	supports	p,	and	therefore	represents	a	relation	of	epistemic	support. If	inferring	needed	a	reckoning	-state,	then	no	route	to	perceptual	experience	would	be	a good	candidate	for	inference.	My	theory	of	inference	rejects	the	need	for	a	reckoning	-state. It	therefore	rejects	the	idea	that	acts	of	inferring	are	structured	by	premise-states, conclusion-states,	and	reckoning	states,	with	the	reckoning	-state	causing	you	to	enter	the conclusion	state,	given	that	you	were	already	in	the	premise-state. So	far	I've	summarized	the	book's	main	claims	using	the	preformationism	example,	a probably	apocryphal	story	about	the	early	users	of	microscopes	that	has	made	its	way	as	a colorful	side-comment	into	histories	of	embryology.1	The	arc	of	the	discussion	begins	with a	philosophical	problem	that	the	book	is	aims	to	solve.	The	problem	is	that	some	cases structured	like	the	preformationism	example	pose	a	simple	question	that	has	no straightforward	answer.	Can	the	preformationist	get	just	as	much	reason	from	his experience	as	he	could,	if	a	phenomenally	indistinguishable	experience	was	not	brought about	by	his	prior	belief	in	preformationism? This	is	a	Yes-or-No	question,	and	neither	answer	at	first	seems	entirely	satisfactory. Answering	Yes	would	respect	the	point	that	perceptual	experiences	are	normally	an excellent	and	indispensable	guide	to	justified	beliefs	and	knowledge	about	countless everything	days.	(Here	as	in	the	book,	I	set	external-world	skepticism	aside).	But	this position	also	allows	that	the	preformationist	could	transition	from	having	an	unjustified belief	in	preformationism	to	a	very	well-justified	one,	as	the	best	explanation	for	why there's	an	embryo	in	the	spermcell	would	be	that	preformationism	is	true.	Such	a	transition seems	a	form	of	confirmation	bias.	Answering	No	respects	the	point	about	confirmation 1	Pinto-Correira	(1997) 3 bias,	but	seems	at	odds	with	the	epistemic	powers	of	experience.	So	we	have	a	problem.	I call	it	"the	problem	of	hijacked	experiences",	to	capture	the	sense	that	an	outlook	is	illicitly steering	the	mind	into	a	perceptual	experience	that	is	congruent.	Not	all	influences	on perceptual	experience	by	one's	prior	outlook	are	epistemically	problematic,	but	the	ones that	are	problematic	result	in	hijacked	experiences. As	I	turned	this	problem	around	in	my	mind,	I	thought	through	many	different	kinds	of examples.	The	kinds	of	examples	that	ultimately	moved	me	to	favor	answering	No	are	a kind	not	often	found	in	Anglophone	philosophy	of	perception,	though	they	are	widely discussed	and	depicted	in	many	other	lines	of	inquiry.	These	examples	are	drawn	from historically	specific	phenomenon	of	racialized	perceptions	in	the	United	States.	In	my	reply to	Pautz	I	elaborate	on	how	these	examples	differ	from	a	standard	type	of	example	in	the philosophy	of	perception,	such	as	seeing	red	spheres	or	ripe	tomatoes,	that	abstract	from social	circumstances.	Pautz	relies	heavily	on	the	standard	type	of	example.	I	argue	that	in normative	contexts	like	this	one,	historically	vivid	examples	should	move	us	more powerfully	than	the	socially	abstracted	ones	on	which	Pautz	bases	his	criticisms.	Lord	and Railton	focus	on	the	things	I	say	about	inference,	and	I	begin	by	replying	them. Reply	to	Lord Lord's	first	objection	is	that	I	overlook	the	possibility	that	reckoning	states	could	be implicit,	so	that	an	inferrer	would	not	have	to	be	aware	that	they	were	in	a	reckoning	state. I	didn't	discuss	this	option	in	The	Rationality	of	Perception	because	the	reckoning	model	is motivated	by	a	self-awareness	of	condition	on	inference.2	Reckoning	explains	why	in inference,	one	does	not	proceed	as	if	in	ignorance	of	what	one	is	responding	to.	And proponents	of	the	reckoning	model,	such	as	Paul	Boghossian,	treat	inference	as fundamentally	a	form	of	reasoning	that	lends	itself	to	self-awareness: "Person-level	reasoning	[is]	mental	action	that	a	person	performs,	in	which	he	is either	aware,	or	can	become	aware,	of	why	he	is	moving	from	some	beliefs	to others."	(Boghossian	2014,	p.	16) It	is	possible	to	develop	reckoning	models	that	divorce	themselves	from	any	self-awareness condition	on	inference,	as	Lord	does.	But	since	such	reckoning	models	lack	the	powerful motivation	given	them	by	the	self-awareness	condition,	they	are	not	the	most	natural	or most	promising	versions	of	the	approach	that	I	oppose. Lord	suggests	that	when	you	infer	q	from	p	without	moving	through	any	state	of	explicit reckoning,	you	can	do	that	by	conceiving	of	p	as	supporting	q.	The	beauty	and	promise conceiving	x	as	y	is	that	even	unsophisticated	creatures	can	have	such	conceptions.	They don't	need	any	of	the	sophisticated	concepts	that	an	explicit	reckoning	state	would	require, such	as	the	normative	concept	of	support.	And	they	don't	have	to	be	aware	that	they	are 2	The	proposal	that	reckoning	states	could	be	unconscious	gets	some	air	time	in	Siegel	2019,	which	is	the main	focus	of	Railton's	contribution. 4 concluding	q	because	they	take	p	to	support	it. But	they're	in	a	reckoning	state	all	the	same –	an	implicit	one.	Lord	thinks	I've	overlooked	this	version	of	the	reckoning	model,	and	that is	his	second	objection	to	the	Inferential	thesis. My	reply	is	that	it	is	so	easy	to	count	as	conceiving	x	as	y	that	subjects	will	have	many implicit	conceptions,	and	this	permissiveness	prevents	Lord	notion	of	conceptions	from being	useful	in	an	analysis	of	inference. Lord	introduces	conceiving	x	as	y	by	noting	something	most	of	us	have	in	common	with dogs:	we	share	a	Newtonian	mechanistic	conception	of	the	world,	"in	virtue	of"	the	fact	that we	expect	bodies	to	behave	in	ways	that	"reflect	Newtonian	mechanics."	[p.	#]	This	gloss suggests	that	having	expectations	that	conform	with	a	conception	of	x	as	y	is	sufficient	for conceiving	of	x	as	y.	But	consider	any	empirically	equivalent	theory	T,	such	as	T1	that posits	desires	on	the	part	of	bodies	that	are	efficacious	under	just	the	conditions	that Newtonian	forces	would	operate,	or	T1	that	posits	a	monitoring	God	poised	to	intervene	to make	things	happen	in	ways	that	conform	to	Newtonian	predictions.	If	expecting	the	bodies to	move	in	ways	that	conform	to	Newtonian	mechanics	is	sufficient	for	having	a	Newtonian conception	of	the	world,	then	it	is	also	sufficient	for	having	conceptions	that	correspond	to T1,	T2,	and	many	other	non-Newtonian	theories.	Implicit	conceptions	will	proliferate. Lord's	point	in	introducing	conceptions	is	to	show	by	analogy	what	it	would	take	for	an inferrer	to	conceive	of	p	as	supporting	q.	By	concluding	q	in	response	to	p,	the	inferrer reflects	that	he	implicitly	conceives	of	p	as	supporting	q.	But	even	if	inferring	reflects	the conception	of	p	as	supporting	q,	what	stops	the	inferring	from	also	reflecting	other conceptions,	such	as	the	conception	according	to	which	I	conclude	q	to	avoid	a	bad consequence,	or	the	one	according	to	which	I	am	exploring	q	to	see	what	things	are	like	if	I do?	For	all	Lord	says	about	what	it	takes	to	conceive	X	as	Y,	my	concluding	q	from	p	will reflect	many	conceptions. This	multiplicity	generates	as	dilemma.	Either	the	conceptions	reflected	in	concluding	q from	p	all	collapse	into	one,	or	else	they	remain	separate.	If	they	all	collapse,	then	it's	hard to	see	why	how	this	account	is	an	account	of	reckoning.	The	conception	that	explains	why someone	concludes	q	from	p	is	equally	one	on	which	she	implicitly	conceives	of	p	as supporting	q,	and	one	on	which	she	implicitly	conceives	of	p	in	some	other	way.	The collapse	option	appears	unable	to	distinguish	reckoning	from	accepting	for	the	sake	of argument,	or	accepting	a	conclusion	under	duress. If	the	conceptions	are	separate,	then	something	besides	the	mere	act	of	concluding	has	to differentiate	between	reckoning	and	the	other	options	I've	listed.	And	that	other	ingredient is	a	chance	to	reintroduce	the	kind	of	self-awareness	that	Lord's	type	of	reckoning	state was	meant	to	avoid. My	Kindness	case	is	meant	to	illustrate	inference	without	reckoning.	Lord	thinks	it illustrates	inference	with	un-self-aware	reckoning.	According	to	him,	the	person	at	the	post office	infers	that	the	clerk	is	kind,	[presumably]	because	she	conceives	of	the	behavior	she observes	as	kind	behavior. 5 I'm	doubtful	that	conceiving	X	as	Y	gives	us	a	viable	account	of	inference	without	reckoning. Lord	focuses	on	it	because	he	thinks	it	promises	an	account	of	inference	that	would account	for	the	Kindness	case,	but	would	not	extend	to	inferences	that	result	in	perceptual experiences. In	the	end,	Lord	agrees	that	hijacked	perceptual	experiences	have	an	epistemic	flaw,	and	he thinks	the	flaw	is	that	they	manifest	dispositions	to	represent	what	is	not	actually	there. This	disposition	is	an	epistemic	vice.	I	think	there	must	be	more	to	the	flaw	than	a disposition	to	have	an	incorrect	experience,	since	we're	all	disposed	to	represent	unequal lines	when	we	see	the	Muller-Lyer	diagram	but	that	does	not	seem	to	be	an	epistemic	flaw, beyond	inaccuracy.3	The	bad-making	feature	remains	to	be	identified. As	I	see	it,	when	hijacked	experiences	are	epistemically	flawed,	the	flaw	redounds	poorly on	the	subject. Lord	may	be	disagreeing,	when	he	writes	"[P]erceptions	can	manifest epistemic	vice,	even	if	they	are	a-rational".	If	a	hijacked	experience	manifests	an	epistemic vice,	why	wouldn't	that	redound	poorly	on	the	subject's	rational	standing?	And	if	it	did, in	what	sense	would	the	experience	be	a-rational? Lord	notes	that	both	hijacked	experiences	and	the	types	of	selection	effects	I	discuss manifest	epistemic	vice,	and	suggests	that	the	category	of	epistemic	vice	provides	a unifying	account	of	the	problem,	whereas	relying	on	inference	to	identify	the	bad-making feature	doesn't	encompass	as	many	cases.	I	agree	with	both	points,	but	I	don't	see	why	we should	expect	unity	in	bad-making	features,	given	the	wide	range	of	ways	in	which outlooks	can	manifest	in	perception	–	by	influencing	patterns	of	attention,	directions	of inquiry,	judgments	made	and	actions	taken	in	response	to	experience. Another	reason	to	expect	disunity	in	the	bad-making	features	is	that	perceptual	experience is	just	one	among	many	likely	examples	of	mental	phenomena	whose	epistemic	evaluability is	overlooked	by	anglophone	epistemology.	Patterns	of	association,	directions	of	inquiry, products	of	imagination,	core	cognition,	emotion,	perceptual	learning,	and	implicit attitudes	are	all	potential	manifestations	of	epistemically	evaluable	outlooks,	and	a	case could	made	that	each	of	these	things	are	epistemically	evaluable.4	Epistemic	vice	may	be	a useful	label	for	what	happens	when	unjustified	outlooks	manifest	themselves	in	any	of these	phenomena	or	in	perceptual	experience,	but	so	long	as	the	exact	bad-making	features remain	underspecified,	it	is	more	useful	as	a	label	than	it	is	as	an	analysis	of	what's	going wrong.	Inference	is	a	useful	way	to	unearth	the	bad-making	features	in	some	of	these	cases, but	not	in	all	of	them.	Given	their	diversity,	it	does	not	count	against	the	inferential	thesis	if it	gives	us	only	a	partial	guide	to	the	contours	of	epistemic	evaluability	in	the	mind. 3	And	on	some	approaches,	even	inaccuracies	can	facilitate	successful	navigation	through	the	environment. Akins	1996,	Prettyman	2019. 4	For	relevant	discussion,	see	Myers	(ms)	on	imagination,	Jenkin	(2020)	on	core	cognition	and	perceptual learning,	Vance	(2014)	on	emotion,	Brownstein	(2019)	and	Beeghly	and	Madva	(2020)	on	implicit	attitudes, Siegel	(forthcoming)	on	patterns	of	association	and	attention,	Watzl	(forthcoming)	on	attention,	and Friedman	(forthcoming)	on	directions	of	inquiry. 6 Reply	to	Railton Railton	agrees	with	me	that	inferring	does	not	need	a	reckoning-state.	He	reads	me	as saying	that	inferring	has	no	further	structure,	beyond	the	idea	that	inferring	is	a	distinctive type	of	rationally	evaluable	response	that	leverages	information	one	has	already,	resulting in	an	epistemically	evaluable	state.	(The	information	could	be	misinformation).	And	here he	disagrees,	on	the	grounds	that	defining	inferring	in	this	way	would	include reinforcement	learning,	which	occurs	by	a	process	of	association,	and	don't	support	any flexibility	in	leveraging	information. For	instance,	if	a	rat	got	to	the	end	of	the	maze	by	reinforcement	learning	by	association,	it is	disposed	to	move	to	the	cheese-spot,	and	the	disposition	is	well-calibrated	only	as	long as	cheese	is	placed	in	the	same	spot.	Moving	the	cheese	or	changing	the	maze	would	not lead	the	rat	to	move	its	path,	absent	another	bout	of	reinforcement	learning.	But	as	it happens,	rats	who	escape	the	maze	can	get	to	the	cheese	by	scurrying	across	the	top	where it	has	never	been	before	is	using	spatial	map	to	infer	that	it	can	reach	the	cheese	using	a path	that	it	did	not	previously	use,	and	so	was	not	part	of	its	associative	learning.	Railton thinks	inferring	is	distinct	from	reinforcement	learning,	and	so	inferring	must	have	more structure	than	he	takes	me	to	say	it	has.	Otherwise,	reinforcement	learning	could	meet	the hallmarks	of	inference	and	so	count	by	my	lights	as	a	kind	of	inferring. I	agree	with	Railton	that	dispositions	produced	by	reinforcement	learning	are	distinct	from inference,	and	a	theory	that	lumped	them	together	would	lose	track	of	the	target phenomenon.	My	reply	is	that	this	distinction	is	built	in	to	the	distinctive	type	of	response that	inferring	is.	The	question	is	then	how	much	the	distinctive	type	of	response	can	be characterized.	My	approach	was	to	contrast	inferring	with	other	kinds	of	responses,	to bring	it	into	focus,	and	I	could	have	added	to	the	dispositions	produced	by	reinforcement learning	to	my	stock	of	contrasts.	(I	already	mention	associations	between	concepts,	but	I was	discussing	states	structured	as	associations,	rather	than	states	that	result	from	an associative	learning	process). Railton	goes	farther,	by	trying	to	explain	how	leveraging	could	happen	without	a reckoning-state.	He	asks:	How	could	responses	to	information	encode	"relations	of evidential	or	means-end	relevance	in	light	of	the	individual's	antecedent	information"? Encoding	such	relations	in	a	way	that	combines	with	them	antecedent	information	would distinguish	this	kind	of	response	from	all	the	other	kinds	I	discuss,	as	well	as	from	the dispositions	generated	by	reinforcement	learning. A	dialectical	point:	an	account	of	how	such	encoding	could	happen	or	even	better,	how	it does	happen	–	would	not	be	at	odds	with	my	approach	to	arguing	that	inferring	does	not need	a	reckoning-state.	I	called	my	approach	"illumination	without	analysis"	because	I didn't	think	analysis	was	needed	to	show	that	there	can	be	inference	without	reckoning, not	because	I	think	there	couldn't	possibly	be	any	analysis.	Both	in	my	paper	"Inference without	reckoning"	and	chapter	5	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	(where	I	give	my	theory of	inference),	I	purport	to	give	"reasons	to	think	that	the	nature	of	inference	may	be illuminated	even	without	positing	any	structure	beyond	what's	posited	by	the	hypothesis 7 that	inferring	is	a	distinctive	kind	of	response	to	an	informational	state,	or	to	a	combination of	such	states,	that	produces	a	conclusion."	I	aimed	to	illuminate	inferring	by	contrasting inferential	responses	to	other	kinds,	whereas	Railton	aims	to	illuminate	inferring	directly, by	describing	its	inner	workings.	These	approaches	are	compatible. Railton's	account	appeals	to	model-based	cognitive	architectures	that	regulate	the organism's	interactions	with	the	environment.	Mental	models	store	information	about	the spatial,	causal,	probabilistic,	and	means-end	relationships	between	a	large	number	of variables,	forming	an	informational	network	that	includes	expectations	about	(inter	alia) how	the	environment	is	likely	to	be,	and	these	expectations	get	weighed	against	new information	that	diverges	from	what's	expected. All	this	sounds	reasonable	as	a	way	of	encoding	relations	of	evidential	support.	How	does	it bear	on	the	idea	that	perceptual	experiences	can	result	from	inferences,	and	so	be rationally	evaluable?	As	Railton	points	out,	model-based	architectures	need	not	generate any	kind	of	rationally	evaluable	states.	He	suggests	that	a	subclass	of	model-based	learning systems	belong	to	rationally	evaluable	systems,	and	that	subclass	are	creatures	who	can "act	under	the	idea	of	figuring	something	out".	For	instance,	his	character	Sin-yee	is	trying to	figure	out	whether	she	can	leap	over	the	puddle,	and	her	ability	to	intend	to	figure something	out	is	what	makes	her	inferring	the	kind	that	ultimately	redounds	on	her rational	standing.	"This	intention,	like	any	intention,	binds	together	the	various	elements	of her	figuring	out	behavior,	and	explains	why	figuring	out	what	to	do	about	the	puddle	is	her her	response	to	the	situation	before	her,	rather	than	something	that	merely	happens	to her." As	a	sufficient	condition	for	having	a	rational	standing,	this	proposal	seems	reasonable. If you	intend	to	figure	something	out,	and	your	intention	plays	the	role	Railton	describes, than	the	activation	of	a	mental	model	is	rationally	evaluable. But	I	doubt	that	all	cases	of	inferring	involve	such	an	intention.	The	closer	one	gets	to perceptual	expertise,	the	less	likely	there	is	to	be	any	intention.	And	in	examples	like	my Kindness	case,	where	someone	strikes	you	as	kind,	there	need	be	no	intention	to	figure	out whether	the	person	is	kind,	or	what	they're	like.	So	while	the	mental	models	definitely	help illuminate	the	nature	of	inference,	they	need	more	help	from	the	factors	that	make	the	use of	those	models	rationally	evaluable.	For	cases	without	a	unifying	intention,	we	may	need more	of	an	account	than	Railton	gives	of	what	makes	the	use	of	a	mental	model	redound well	or	poorly	on	a	subject. We	need	such	an	account	to	make	sense	of	cases	of	inferring that	don't	lead	to	perceptual	experience,	and	once	we	have	it,	it	seems	that	nothing precludes	perceptual	experiences	from	being	able	to	result	from	inferring	as	well. Reply	to	Pautz Pautz	focuses	on	the	Downgrade	Thesis.	He	finds	that	he	has	an	intuition	against	it	and concludes	that	perceptual	experiences	must	be	a-rational.	As	Pautz	sees	it,	the	Downgrade Thesis	is	the	main	support	for	the	idea	that	perceptual	experiences	can	be	rational	or 8 irrational.	This	idea	would	be	significantly	undermined,	he	thinks,	if	the	Downgrade	Thesis turned	out	to	be	false. Pautz's	main	objection	to	The	Rationality	of	Perception	appears	to	be	methodological.	He thinks	there	are	powerful	intuitions	against	the	Downgrade	Thesis.	These	intuitions	are directed	at	both	examples	and	general	principles,	such	as	the	principle	of	Probability Increase.	In	his	main	example,	a	perceiver	undergoes	an	introspectively	seamless	transition from	a	hijacked	hallucination	to	a	non-hijacked	and	veridical	perception.5	In	this	case,	it	is meant	to	be	intuitive	that	the	phenomenal	continuity	goes	along	with	continuity	of justificatory	power. Pautz	wonders	why	I	don't	consider	these	intuitions	decisive	in	countering	both	the Downgrade	Thesis	and	the	idea	that	perceptual	experiences	can	be	rational	or	irrational, especially	since	when	I	lay	out	the	problem	of	hijacked	experiences,	I	say	I	feel	the	force	of the	idea	that	perceptual	experiences	provide	justificatory	power	in	virtue	of	their phenomenal	character. I	came	to	accept	both	the	Downgrade	Thesis	and	the	more	radical	idea	that	experiences	are epistemically	evaluable	after	considering	a	range	of	similarly	structured	cases	with	vastly different	subject-matters.	The	kinds	of	cases	that	ultimately	moved	me	from	the	puzzle	to my	solution	fill	in	psychological	details	of	situations	that	actually	occur,	regularly,	at specific	places	and	times.	For	all	we	know,	cases	that	meet	my	specifications	have	actually occurred,	though	it	is	not	possible	to	find	out.	Whether	they	are	actual	or	not,	they	are sociologically	realistic.	Whether	they	are	psychologically	realistic	is	still	a	matter	of	dispute. By	contrast,	Pautz's	cases	are	both	psychologically	unrealistic	and	socially	abstracted.6 Experiences	of	red	spheres	abstract	from	the	great	complexity	of	perception,	including	any historical,	psychological,	or	social	context.	I	think	both	types	of	examples	are	indispensable in	the	philosophy	of	perception,	and	in	philosophy	generally.	It's	therefore	crucial	to understand	when	each	type	of	example	is	a	fitting	one	to	use,	especially	when	they	pull	in different	directions	–	as	they	do	when	it	comes	to	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis. In	Pautz's	seamless	transition	example,	an	individual	looks	at	a	red	sphere.	Why	this person	is	doing	that,	how	it	makes	them	feel,	and	who	they	are	in	relation	to	us	or	other people	is	not	specified,	because	these	things	are	not	supposed	to	matter.	And	for	many aspects	of	perception,	these	things	don't	matter.	It	has	proved	useful	and	important	to consider	pared-down	to	limit	the	type	of	experience	to	color	experience,	ignoring	as	many other	features	presented	in	experience	as	possible,	such	as	temporal	dynamics	and	social cues.	By	focusing	on	such	cases,	philosophers	made	enormous	progress	in	developing theories	of	the	invariant	structures	of	visual	experience.	By	omitting	specifications	of irrelevant	things,	one	is	not	pretending	that	perceptual	experiences	occurs	outside	of	any social	context	(whatever	that	would	mean).	No	one	thinks	that	when	you	actually	see	a	red sphere	(such	as	a	tomato),	you	necessarily	lack	moral	feelings	or	cease	to	be	embedded	in 5	Similar	cases	discussed	by	Johnston	(2004)	and	White	(2014) 6	On	psychology	of	hallucination,	see	Macpherson	(ed) 9 any	social	situation.	When	there's	no	reason	to	think	that	these	things	would	make	a difference	to	the	structural	properties	of	perceptual	experience,	there	is	usually	no	reason to	control	for	them	either	in	thought	experiments	or	real	experiments. But	the	things	this	type	of	example	abstracts	from	might	make	a	difference	when	we're discussing	the	boundaries	of	epistemic	evaluability.	When	we're	asking	about	the	rational standing	of	our	fellow	human	beings,	it	makes	sense	to	consider	cases	that	are	close	to	the ones	in	which	our	normative	notions	are	ultimately	meant	to	apply.	Social	relationships and	affect	are	deeply	relevant	to	the	fittingness	of	emotion	and	to	the	justification	of	some beliefs.	If	we're	asking	what	would	be	a	reasonable	state	of	mind	for	someone	to	be	in,	our verdicts	and	predictions	about	that	need	to	stand	up	to	human	situations	in	their	full complexity. For	this	reason,	in	considering	whether	the	scope	of	epistemic	evaluability	extends	to perceptual	experience,	I	found	it	useful	to	consider	the	historically	realistic	example	of brutal	yet	culturally	normal	situation	that	recurs	in	the	history	of	United	States.	Since	my book	probes	the	idea	that	perceptual	experiences	could	redound	well	or	poorly	on	a person,	it's	important	to	test	this	idea	against	perceptual	situations	that	don't	abstract	from the	kinds	of	complexities	missing	from	cases	like	the	red	sphere. Those	complexities	are rightly	missing	when	we're	asking	about	the	metaphysics	of	experience,	but	it's	less obvious	that	such	examples	should	be	our	paradigms	when	we're	asking	about	justificatory power	and	rational	standing.	The	features	in	perception	we	abstract	away	from	might	be relevant	a	perceiver's	rational	standing. And	I	think	that's	just	what	we	find.	In	the	type	of	case	I	focus	on	there	are	massive	protests and	indignation	after	someone	almost	always	a	man,	usually	white,	often	armed	and	often a	police	officer	is	acquitted	for	using	force	often	lethal	force	against	someone	else	who is	black	(usually	a	man	or	a	boy),	on	the	grounds	that	the	shooter's	belief	that	that	man	or boy	posed	imminent	severe	danger	was	reasonable.7	The	protests	come	mostly	from people	who	live	regularly	with	the	threat	of	this	kind	of	violence	against	them,	their siblings,	cousins,	etc.	and	who	therefore	navigate	the	consequences	of	being	perceived	as threatening. 7	Three	examples:	2014	Ferguson.	In	explaining	to	a	grand	jury	why	it	was	reasonable	for him	to	shoot	his	gun	at	18	year	old	Michael	Brown,	Darren	Wilson	describes	Brown	as having	"the	most	intense	aggressive	face.	The	only	way	I	can	describe	it,	it	looks	like	a demon,	that's	how	angry	he	looked." 1973	riots in Queens. Officer Thomas Shea (first NYC police officer tried for murder while on duty) acquitted for shooting to death 10 year-old Clifford Glover. Claimed the 4th grader was reaching for a gun, but no gun was ever found. 1964 Harlem riots. Officer Thomas Gilligan shot and killed 15-year-old James Powell in Yorkville. They claimed he had a knife, but no knife was ever found. Other cases never became part of public political life but show the same pattern of acquittal and indignance. 10 You	could	see	the	acquittals	and	the	protests	as	a	living	disagreement	about	whether	the beliefs	were	reasonable.	What's	culturally	normal	is	both	the	legal	classification	of	these beliefs	as	reasonable,	and	the	refusal	to	accept	that	epistemic	categorization	of	them,	on	the grounds	that	the	fear	deemed	reasonable	by	legal	institutions	is	an	unreasonable	cultural myth	of	the	dangerous	black	boy	or	man,	operating	in	the	minds	of	individuals. My	route	to	the	Downgrade	Thesis	and	the	Rationality	of	Perception	does	not	involve considering	a	perceptual	scenario	and	then	having	an	intuition	about	it.	(For	this	reason,	I wouldn't	characterize	the	dialectical	situation,	as	Pautz	does,	as	"intuition-swapping"). Instead	my	reaction	came	from	considering	whether	the	massive	reactions	to	the	repeated situation	would	or	should	be	any	different,	if	the	protestors	learned	that	the	shooters	had hallucinated	cues	for	danger	(a	menacing	look,	a	gun,	etc).	Presumably	many	of	the protestors	think	that	is	exactly	what	happened. If	someone	always	hallucinated	a	threatening	situation	when	they	saw	you,	and	if	the situation	they	hallucinated	jibed	with	an	entrenched	cultural	stereotype	that	imposed limitations	on	you,	you'd	be	justifiably	offended.	"But	it's	just	a	hallucination	–	like	seeming to	see	a	red	sphere",	someone	might	say.	This	would	be	a	poor	defense,	because	in	the context	we're	considering,	it	isn't	just	a	hallucination.	It's	an	experience	that	manifests	a cultural	situation,	with	a	political	dynamic	operating	through	it.	A	cultural	myth	is operating	through	individual	minds. When	I	focus	on	the	cultural	myth	operating	in	individual	minds,	it	doesn't	seem	to	matter whether	its	manifestation	takes	the	form	of	perceptual	experience	or	just	belief.	In particular,	it	does	not	seem	incumbent	on	someone	to	whom	the	fear	was	directed	to excuse	the	officers	upon	learning	they	their	racist	outlook	had	reached	all	the	way	to	their perceptual	experiences. If	a	racist	hallucinates	me	as	dangerous,	I	have	several	reactions. I'm	terrified	(especially	when	this	person	is	armed),	angry,	offended,	and	I'm	more	inclined to	think	the	hallucinator	has	an	epistemic	problem	than	I	am	to	think	they're	being reasonable	because	their	twisted	outlook	has	infiltrated	all	the	way	to	their	perceptual experience.	It	redounds	poorly	on	him	if	the	hallucinator	can't	see	an	ordinary	male	young person	for	what	he	is,	whether	he	is	an	ordinary	shoplifting	teenager,	or	an	ordinary youngster	just	going	about	his	business.	A	perceptual	experience	does	not	give	someone reason	to	think	a	person	is	dangerous,	even	if	dangerous	is	the	way	the	teenager	(or	child) looks	to	him. These	responses	are	at	odds	with	the	idea	that	the	perceptual	experiences	provide justificatory	support	for	thinking	the	person	seen	is	dangerous,	absent	defeaters.	If	you're on	the	receiving	end	of	such	twisted	perceptions,	this	conclusion	might	even	seem	plain. When	such	perceptual	experiences	are	extensions	of	unjustified	beliefs,	the	difference between	perceptual	experience	and	belief	seems	less	significant. Pautz	writes	"It	would	be	wrong	to	suggest	that	opponents	of	DT	must	accept	the	obviously false	claim	that	in	these	circumstances	Jill	would	be	justified	in	shooting	Jack.	They	only	say that	her	believing	that	Jack's	face	has	the	anger-features	(the	content	of	her	experience)	is rational	in	her	circumstances".	But	in	cases	where	self-defense	law	is	properly	applied, 11 having	a	perceptual	experience	of	someone	as	threatening	could	go	a	long	way	toward making	it	reasonable	to	react	violently	in	order	to	protect	yourself.	It	becomes	unclear	why the	person	lacks	reason	for	aggression,	if	their	experience	has	just	as	much	power	as perceptual	experiences	typically	do. Pautz	classifies	my	cases	as	"science	fiction",	but	this	is	a	misnomer.	Science	fiction	is	a genre	in	which	things	are	depicted	that	violate	the	laws	of	nature.	The	scenarios	I'm considering	are	hypothetical	extension	of	all-to-realistic	situations,	well	within	the	laws	of nature.	Abstracting	from	social	context	is	appropriate	for	many	questions	in	the	philosophy of	perception,	but	when	it	comes	to	whether	they	redound	well	or	poorly	on	the	perceivers, we	need	to	be	able	to	bring	our	normative	notions	into	contact	with	social	realities.	Here's	a case	where	we	don't	gain	any	clarity	of	focus	by	abstracting	from	this	kind	of	specificity.	We lose	clarity. In	addition	to	his	methodological	objection,	Pautz	raises	two	important	residual	questions. First,	he	asks	about	the	scope	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis:	does	it	apply	beyond visual	experiences	to	include	olfactory	and	auditory	experience?	Yes.	The	scope	of	the thesis	is	perceptual	experiences,	which	are	experiences	that	feel	like	perception	of	spatially located	things.	The	sensory	modalities	can	produce	experiences	that	are	not	perceptual	in this	sense,	as	when	one	hears	a	noise	but	it	seems	to	come	from	within	one's	mind	with	no directionality.	And	perhaps	olfactory	imagination	when	you	imagine	(or	remember)	a	smell can	produce	a	type	of	olfactory	experience	that	is	not	perceptual.	But	perceptual experiences	in	any	modality	are	the	ones	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	applies	to. Since	experiences	in	this	category	purport	to	present	us	with	things	in	the	external	world, they	are	all	good	candidates	for	having	accuracy	conditions. Second,	Pautz	asks	which	of	the	norms	that	apply	to	belief	also	apply	to	perceptual experience.	The	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	entails	that	perceptual	experiences	can redound	well	or	poorly	on	a	subject,	depending	on	how	those	experiences	are	formed.	I agree	with	Pautz	that	having	experiences	with	contradictory	contents	need	not	be	a	mark of	irrationality	in	itself	(though	see	Byrne	2016	for	the	opposing	view).	In	general,	I	think we	can	distinguish	three	main	types	of	normative	pressures	on	belief:	coherence	norms that	govern	the	ways	that	adding	or	removing	beliefs	should	affect	the	rest	of	one's	mental state;	evidential	norms	governing	how	one	ought	to	respond	to	evidence;	and	normative pressures	on	what	one	should	have	beliefs	about,	for	example	in	the	form	of	norms	of inquiry.	It's	possible	and	even	likely	that	norms	from	these	different	categories	may	end	up exerting	opposing	pressures.8	The	fact	that	norms	exert	opposing	pressures	makes	it implausible	that	they	stand	or	fall	as	a	whole.	If	coherence	norms	ended	up	not	applying	to experience,	that	wouldn't	be	a	strike	against	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis. Bibliography 8	On	a	possible	tension	between	coherence	and	evidential	norms,	see	Worsnip	2018.	On	possible	tension between	evidential	norms	and	norms	governing	what	to	have	beliefs	about,	see	Friedman	2020. 12 Akins,	K.	(1996).	Of	sensory	systems	and	the	'aboutness'	of	mental	states.	Journal	of Philosophy,	93,	337–372. Beeghly,	E.	and	A.	Madva.	(2020)	An	Introduction	to	Implicit	Bias:	Knowledge,	Justice,	and the	Social	Mind.	New	York,	NY,	USA:	Routledge. Boghossian,	P.	(2014)	What	is	inference?	Philosophical	Studies	169(1):	1-18. Brownstein,	M.	(2019)	The	Implicit	Mind.	Oxford	University	Press. Byrne,	A.	2016.	Epistemic	Significance	of	Experience.	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological Research.	DOI:	10.1111/phpr.12246 Friedman,	J.	(2020)	The	Epistemic	and	The	Zetetic	Philosophical	review Jenkin,	Z.	(2020)	The	epistemic	role	of	core	cognition.	Philosophical	Review Johnston,	M.	(2004)	The	obscure	object	of	hallucination.	Philosophical	Studies	120	(13):113-83. Macpherson,	F.	and	D.	Platchias,	eds.	(2013)	Hallucination	Cambridge:	MIT	Press. Myers,	J.	(ms,	2020)	The	epistemic	status	of	the	imagination Pinto-Correira	(1997)	The	Ovary	of	Eve.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press. Prettyman,	Adrienne	(2019).	Perceptual	precision.	Philosophical	Psychology	32	(6):923944. Vance,	J.	(2013)	Emotion	and	the	new	epistemic	challenge	from	cognitive	penetrability. Philosophical	Studies	169(2):	257-83. Worsnip,	A.	(2018)	"The	conflict	of	evidence	and	coherence"	Philosophy	and Phenomenological	Research	DOI:	10.1111/phpr.12246 White,	R.	(2014)	What	is	my	evidence	that	here	is	a	hand?	In	D.	Dodd	&	E.	Zardini (Eds.),	Scepticism	and	perceptual	justification.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.